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The Increasing Burden of Armaments



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THE INCREASING BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS

by

WILLIAM T. STONE

and

DAVID H. POPPER

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

INTRODUCTION

REPORTS of increased military preparations throughout the world have been disturbingly frequent in recent months. In Europe warlike maneuvers have accompanied the political realignment which has followed the advent of Hitler,¹ while France, Italy and the Little Entente have taken active steps to meet the potential threat of a re-armed Nazi Germany. The abortive Austrian Nazi *Putsch* of July 1934 revealed Italy's readiness to take the field in defense of Austria's independence and the opposition of Yugoslavia to Italian military measures. In the Far East Japan has intensified military, naval and air preparations and doubled its national defense budget since the occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, while the U.S.S.R. has concentrated a large military force in eastern Siberia, including more than 500 airplanes.

Since October 12, 1933, when Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, all efforts to reach an accord on the limitation of armaments have been without avail. While Great Britain, France and Italy debated the academic question whether Germany should be allowed to increase its armaments, the Reich budget for 1934-1935 revealed a heavy increase for land, sea and air forces. In June 1934 the French government voted an extraordinary credit of three billion francs for construction of naval vessels, airplanes and completion of the frontier defenses. In July Italy authorized more than a billion lire for modernization of the Italian air corps. In the same month Great Britain announced an air program calling for forty-one new air squadrons to be completed within the next few years.

The military expenditures of every great power except Germany have risen above the

pre-war level. The extent of these increases is shown in the following table:²

	National currency (in millions)		Percentage of increase	Index of wholesale prices 1913=100
	1913	1934		
France	1,807	2,273.8	25.8	82
Italy	927	1,171.6	26.3	75.2
Great Britain ..	77.2	114.9	48.8	102
United States ..	244.6	711.5	190.9	109
Japan	191.8	935.9	388	135

Corresponding increases are shown in the current budget estimates for other powers. Despite the drastic restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, Germany's 1934-1935 military, naval and air outlays are only 43.3 per cent less than the total cost of the great imperial army and navy in 1913.³ When it is recalled that unrestricted competition in armaments reached its apex during the decade before the World War, these figures appear even more significant. In 1858, when modern armies first began to appear in Europe, the combined military expenditures of all European countries amounted to approximately \$460,000,000 — less than the French military forces alone in 1934.⁴ During the next fifty years armament expenditures in Europe increased more than five times, and from 1908 to 1913 alone they rose more than fifty per cent.⁵

Since the World War military and naval establishments have been universally retained as instruments of national policy, notwithstanding the provisions for limitation and reduction of armaments incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant. Military expenditures have consumed a large proportion of national budgets. In 1934 the percentage of national budgets devoted to the upkeep of

1. Cf. Vera M. Dean, "Toward a New Balance of Power in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 9, 1934.

2. Cf. Appendix, p. 222, for details of national defense expenditures and sources. The 1934 expenditures for France and Italy are converted into pre-war gold currency units.

3. Cf. Appendix, p. 222.

4. Cf. Per Jacobsson, "Armaments Expenditure of the World," reprinted from *The Economist* (London), 1928, p. 8.

5. *Ibid.*

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land, naval and air forces was 16.4 in Great Britain; 17.1 in Germany; 17.9 in the United States; 20.8 in Italy; 22.3 in France; and 43.7 in Japan.⁶

The character of the armed forces supported by these mounting budgets has changed less since 1918 than is generally realized. Virtually all modern armies continue to rely chiefly on man-power, despite the costly stalemate produced by the use of unwieldy mass armies during the World War. All of the larger powers except Germany, the United States and Great Britain have maintained the conscript system first introduced in Germany after the Napoleonic Wars and generally adopted in Europe after 1870. Under this system all able-bodied male citizens undergo a period of intensive training with the active forces, after which they are organized in reserve formations subject to call in case of war. The forces available for immediate mobilization are thus many times larger than the number of effectives maintained in the peace-time organization.

The only large European countries which have not maintained the conscript system are Germany and the other defeated powers. Compelled by the Versailles Treaty to adopt a small, long-term professional army, Germany has sought to compensate for lack of numbers by developing a high degree of mobility and concentrated power of attack. The professional armies maintained by the United States and Great Britain, while not supported by a large trained reserve, are organized as skeleton forces capable of expansion into large citizen armies in time of emergency.

Post-war organization, however, has been modified in some respects by new technical developments and changing military conceptions. European conscript armies have reduced the period of active service from a pre-war average of three or four years to one or two years. At the same time France and other European countries have increased the number of professional troops recruited for long-term service. Professional and conscript armies alike have endeavored to achieve greater mobility by the development of mechanized and modernized units and the expansion of air forces. The cost of mechanization, however, and the traditional conservatism of military leaders have retarded the development of completely mechanized units.

Since 1918, an increasing proportion of the military budgets of the great powers has been devoted to the purchase and manufacture of war material. In recent years France has devoted 17 per cent of its army budget to procurement of war material; Great Britain,

10; Italy, 16; Germany, 23; and Japan, 22.7. These funds have been used for replacement of obsolete war material, purchase of tanks, machine-guns, heavy ordnance, and for motorization of artillery and cavalry.

The expansion of air power has produced a most notable change since 1914. At the outbreak of the World War the Allied armies had a combined strength of less than 400 airplanes, which increased to more than 30,000 before the end of 1918. In 1934 every great power except Germany possesses a large powerful air force capable of long distance flights and sustained operation in the air. Appropriations for military and naval aviation have increased rapidly since 1918. The British air budget for 1934 is more than half as large as the army budget, while the French and Italian air forces received approximately one-fourth as much as the land forces.

The following summary attempts to describe the present military, naval and air organization in the seven great powers, and to summarize recent military activities.

GREAT BRITAIN

Under the pressure of European political events British military expenditures increased in 1933 for the first time in more than six years. Post-war appropriations for national defense, although considerably higher than pre-war outlays, remained relatively stable from 1922 to 1927.⁸ For the next six years the annual defense appropriations dropped from £117.3 million to £105.5 million in 1932. The following year, after Hitler's advent to power in Germany, they rose to £110.3 million and in 1934 to a total of £114.9 million.⁹

The organization of Great Britain's armed forces has not changed radically since the World War. The British Regular Army remains a small professional force designed to carry out three primary missions: home defense, protection of overseas territories, and maintenance of an expeditionary force capable of meeting the "military needs of the Empire, wherever they may arise."¹⁰ Its strength was reduced from 160,000 officers and men in 1925 to 148,700 in 1933.¹¹ In time of war this force is augmented by mobilization of the regular reserve, composed

7. Cf. League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, National Defense Expenditure Commission, *Technical Committee Report*, Conf. D. 153, Vol. 2.

8. Net expenditures for the army and navy in 1913 amounted to £77,200,000; 1922, £116,700,000; 1925, £120,400,000. Cf. League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1925.

9. Cf. Appendix, p. 222.

10. Great Britain, *Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence* (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1924), Cmd. 2029, p. 5. The army is not responsible for dealing with organized invasion from the sea—a naval function.

11. The pre-war strength of the British Army, exclusive of the British Army in India, was 174,000. In 1913 the Indian Army consisted of 75,000 British and 150,000 Indian troops; in 1930 British troops had been reduced to 60,000 and Indian troops increased to 162,000.

6. Cf. Appendix, p. 224.

of approximately 125,000 officers and men who have completed active service and are subject to call in emergency. A supplementary reserve is composed of roughly 20,000 specialists and technicians. An independent militia, the territorial army, is composed of 132,000 officers and men available for home defense but not liable to service overseas without a special act of Parliament.¹²

The British Army has experimented with various forms of mechanized and motorized units since 1925 but has not adopted a complete all-armored force as proposed by advanced advocates of mechanization.¹³ New experiments in the organization of infantry, designed both to increase mobility and to secure greater concentration of fire power through the addition of a strong machine-gun battalion to each infantry brigade, are being carried out this year.¹⁴ Mechanical development has been pushed forward steadily since 1924, although tanks and armored vehicles have not been produced in large numbers.

Under the Washington and London naval treaties, Great Britain relinquished the absolute supremacy at sea which was the determining factor of British policy before the World War,¹⁵ accepting parity with the United States and a capital ship ratio of 5-3 with Japan. Although the fleet has not been maintained at the maximum treaty levels, the annual construction programs have provided for regular replacement of over-age vessels,¹⁶ and appropriations have increased since 1932.

The British air force, regarded as purely ancillary to the older services in 1914, emerged from the World War as a separate service under a separate air ministry. In 1923 a special sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence made an exhaustive report on the relations of the three services and submitted a series of recommendations designed to develop closer coordination. This report declared that "British air power must include a Home Defence Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country."¹⁷ For the time being the committee proposed a Home Defence Force of fifty-two squadrons, with the possibility of future expansion.

The 1923 program was retarded for nearly ten years because of the disarmament negotiations at Geneva and financial stringency at home. By the end of 1933, however, failure to reach a disarmament agreement and the symptoms of unrest in Europe led the National government to reconsider the whole basis of Imperial defense, particularly the air program. At this time the Home Defence Force consisted of forty-two squadrons — ten squadrons short of the figure set in 1923. The total strength of the Royal Air Force consisted of approximately seventy-seven squadrons, or 850 first-line planes,¹⁸ a strength considerably below that of other neighboring powers. France, according to figures submitted to Parliament by Prime Minister MacDonald, possessed 1,650 first-line planes; Soviet Russia, 1,300 to 1,500; the United States, 1,050; Italy, 1,050; and Japan, 800 to 1,000.¹⁹ While still professing its readiness to follow a policy of disarmament on the basis of parity in the air, the government announced on March 8 that: "If all our (disarmament) efforts fail . . . this Government will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores."²⁰ Four months later the government announced: "We cannot delay longer a measure which will in the next few years bring the air force up to a level closer approaching that of our nearest neighbours." The program, announced by Stanley Baldwin on July 19, called for the addition of forty-one new air squadrons, or 460 planes, to be completed within the next five years. The Home Defence Force would be increased to seventy-five squadrons (instead of fifty-two contemplated in 1923), and the total air strength would be brought up to approximately one hundred and twenty squadrons, or 1,320 first-line planes.²¹ The cost of the entire program was estimated at £20,000,000.

Official spokesmen made no effort to conceal the fact that this decision had been influenced largely by Germany's plans for rearmament in the air. On July 31 Stanley Baldwin, addressing the House of Commons, employed a phrase which was heard round the world: ". . . when you think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine."²² While the air program was described as tentative and subject to revision in the light of future developments, it was widely accepted as marking a definite turning point in British policy.

12. Cf. *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 742, 745.

13. Cf. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), for a review of British experiments with mechanized forces.

14. Cf. *The Times* (London), August 18, 1934.

15. In 1910 the Committee of Imperial Defence declared: "The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence . . ." Quoted in *Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence*, cited, p. 5.

16. Cf. William T. Stone, "Impending Naval Rivalry," *Foreign Policy Reports*, April 11, 1934.

17. Great Britain, *Report of Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence*, cited, p. 21.

18. Great Britain, House of Commons, *Debates*, February 20, 1934. In addition the Home Defence Force maintained 13 non-regular squadrons.

19. Great Britain, House of Commons, *Debates*, January 31, 1934.

20. *Ibid.*, March 8, 1934.

21. *Ibid.*, July 19, 1934.

22. *Ibid.*, July 31, 1934.

FRANCE

Recent events in Europe have also intensified war preparations in France. While regular budgetary appropriations have been reduced since 1932 in response to the government's deflationary policy, an extraordinary credit of some 3,000,000,000 francs for military purposes was voted in June 1934. Acting under a scarcely veiled threat that he would take extra-parliamentary measures if necessary, Premier Doumergue explained that 880,000,000 francs of this sum had already been expended and that the remainder was urgently needed to carry out important defense projects. The largest single item was 1,275,000,000 francs for completion of the chain of fortresses along the Franco-German and Franco-Belgian frontiers.²³ The navy was allotted 865,000,000 francs for creation of underground fuel reservoirs to ensure a six months' war supply for French warships, and for strengthening coast defenses and naval aviation. The Air Ministry was granted 980,000,000 francs for reorganization of the air forces and for new construction.²⁴

Definite steps to place the army in a state of readiness for any emergency have been taken during the past year. In 1934 the government opened the enlistment rolls without definite limitation for long-service professional troops, to strengthen existing garrisons and provide for the occupation and defense of the new frontier fortifications.²⁵ The number of professional troops had previously been raised to 106,000 in a law enacted in 1928 for the reorganization of the army.²⁶ Under the terms of this basic law the initial period of service for conscripts was reduced from eighteen months to one year.²⁷ Conscripts are trained by a portion of the professional troops and are incorporated in divisional organizations within each of the twenty areas into which France is divided for purposes of conscription and mobilization. In the event of war, the initial fighting force available until the reserves can be mobilized is composed of that portion of the professional troops which guards the frontiers, conscripts of the class serving with the colors,²⁸ and the members of the three annual classes of reserves immediately preceding

them. The latter may be mobilized by the government without parliamentary approval. In addition, about 70,000 "mobile forces" regularly stationed in France and intended as a colonial reserve are available, while 135,000 troops in Algeria, Tunis and Morocco may be transported to the continent with slight delay.²⁹ In 1933 effectives with the colors in France were calculated at 330,485, while the total number of troops at home and in the colonies was 558,067.³⁰

Although France continues to rely on the mass army employed during the World War, it has made some progress toward mechanization and motorization. Over forty per cent of all artillery, including fortress artillery and railway guns, is motorized.³¹ Replacement of antiquated war material is well under way. Twenty-five tank battalions are attached to units in France and the colonies.³² One of the six cavalry divisions is completely motorized and mechanized, and there is one additional mechanized cavalry brigade; the remaining five cavalry divisions have two motorized machine-gun squadrons each.³³ One infantry division is mechanized and motorized, and there are several motorized machine-gun regiments.

French naval construction has kept pace with that of Italy in the Mediterranean and Germany in the Atlantic. Never reconciled to the equality in capital ships granted to Italy at the Washington Naval Conference, France has successfully preserved its superiority in submarines and cruisers. France's answer to the German "pocket-battleships" of the *Deutschland* type was the *Dunkerque*, a vessel of 26,500 tons, with a speed of 29 knots and an armament of eight 13-inch guns. The *Dunkerque* was the first capital ship to be laid down by any power since the Washington conference. Should Italy proceed with its announced plan to construct two 35,000 ton battleships, the French government has indicated it would reply in kind—thus establishing a new standard which may prevent reduction in capital ships by Great Britain, the United States and Japan. At the end of 1933 France had under construction thirty-seven vessels totaling 141,000 tons, as compared with thirty-four ships of 129,000 tons under construction or projected in Italy. The 1934 naval building pro-

23. The Belgian government has likewise appropriated 759,000,000 francs for frontier defense. *Le Temps*, May 6, 1934.

24. *Le Temps*, June 16, 30, 1934.

25. *Le Temps*, July 5, 19, 1934; *The Times*, July 4, 1934. The number of special service troops necessary for the frontiers has been placed at between 20,000 and 30,000.

26. Cf. Général Marie-Eugène Debeney, *Sur la sécurité militaire de la France* (Paris, Payot, 1930), Chap. 2.

27. This period has not been extended, despite the shortage of men of military age due to the low birth rate during the years of the World War.

28. Men are called up at six-month intervals, so that there is a constant supply of trained forces at hand. Debeney, *Sur la sécurité militaire de la France*, cited. Six divisions are kept fully organized in the frontier regions.

29. League of Nations, *Particulars Concerning the Position of Armaments in the Various Countries*, C.440.M.187 (1). 1931. IX; *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 260.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 259-260. The totals were 559,853 in 1930, 565,716 in 1931, and 593,040 in 1932. *Armaments Year-Book*, 1933, cited, p. 262-264.

31. R. J. Icks, "How Armies Are Mechanizing," *Army Ordnance*, May-June 1934, p. 330.

32. Cf. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare*, cited, p. 176.

33. Icks, "How Armies Are Mechanizing," cited, p. 331; *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 232-233. Four of the six are to be completely motorized by the end of 1934.

gram comprises one additional battleship of the *Dunkerque* type, a flotilla leader, an ocean-going submarine and a small submarine.³⁴

The French air force, organized as a separate arm of service, is numerically the largest in the world. According to the latest available figures, it numbers approximately 3,000 military planes, of which 1,650 are first-line machines.³⁵ The 980,000,000 franc credit recently voted for the Air Ministry is an answer to air activities across the Rhine. To the specter of a great German civilian air fleet which might be transformed into bombing planes has been added the firm conviction that the Nazi government is proceeding secretly to build up a military air force. During the spring and summer of 1934 the French public witnessed numerous air maneuvers and preparations for passive defense of civilian populations. A first step in this direction was taken when the General Council of the Department of the Seine appropriated 20,000,000 francs for the construction of subterranean refuges and the support of first-aid and relief organizations. A complete program for defense against aerial raids has been prepared under the direction of national authorities.³⁶

ITALY

Although financial stringency has hampered the material development of Italy's armed forces in recent years, moral preparation for war has been carried further in Italy than in any other European country, with the possible exception of Germany and Russia. At the close of the 1934 army maneuvers, in which members of the Cabinet participated, Premier Mussolini declared that war "is in the air."³⁷ On September 17 a Cabinet decree ordered military training for all males from the age of eight to thirty-three. Under this decree, which extends previous laws, military instruction will be divided into three stages. The first, or pre-military stage, will prepare boys physically and mentally to bear arms. The second, or active stage, will consist of technical training with the armed forces. The third stage will maintain the military efficiency of trained soldiers for ten years after their period of active service.³⁸

Active military training begins at the age of eighteen, with a three-year period of instruction in the Fascist militia. The militia forms a part of the armed forces of the state

and is incorporated in the army in time of war. At twenty-one all physically fit male citizens are subject to eighteen months' service with the army, after which they retire to the reserves for ten years. In recent years approximately 200,000 men have been called up annually, although conscripts have not served the full statutory term of eighteen months.³⁹ In 1933 the average effectives totaled 426,531 during the six spring and summer months and 270,191 during the remainder of the year.⁴⁰ In addition, the armed forces included 92,635 effectives of formations organized on a military basis and 373,590 Fascist militia.⁴¹ The organization of the Italian Army is similar to that of France and other conscript countries. For military purposes the nation is divided into thirty territorial districts, which in turn are grouped into eleven corps areas and the Sicilian military command.⁴²

The Italian defense budget has steadily declined since 1930. The average appropriation of five billion lire for military purposes, however, represents an increasing purchasing power as the Italian government pursues its deflationary financial policy.⁴³ Moreover, large extraordinary expenditures for the near future have been announced recently. Under a decree of July 5, 1934, an expenditure of 1,200,000,000 lire was authorized for construction and modernization of the air forces during the next two or three years; 354,000,000 lire was voted for new naval construction between 1935 and 1938; while in an earlier decree 480,000,000 lire was authorized for the same purpose.⁴⁴

Budgetary limitations have not prevented the building of a strong air force, which comprised 1,507 airplanes in commission and reserve in 1931.⁴⁵ Mechanization and motorization have made moderate progress despite the difficulties of operation in a mountainous terrain; half of the heavy artillery is motorized, while infantry and cavalry units are being provided with new motor equipment.⁴⁶ Although Italian naval construction has not kept pace with that of France, annual building programs have provided an increasing fleet of cruisers, destroyers and submarines,

39. League of Nations, *Particulars Concerning the Position of the Armaments of the Different Countries*, C.557.M.227, 1931, IX, p. 2.

40. *Armaments Year-Book, 1934*, cited, p. 399. Total effectives for the year 1933, at home and overseas, were 507,760.

41. In 1932 the Fascist militia and 20,000 reservists were recalled for thirty- and twenty-day periods of training with the colors. *Ibid.*, p. 399-400.

42. *Armaments Year-Book, 1934*, cited, p. 367-370.

43. *Cf. Armaments Year-Book, 1934*, cited, p. 426.

44. *Cf. New York Times*, August 1, 1934; *Le Temps*, August 4, 1934. Mussolini told the Chamber of Deputies on May 26 that 1,000,000,000 lire would be spent for naval building by 1940. *The Times*, May 28, 1934.

45. *Armaments Year-Book, 1934*, cited, p. 408.

46. *Cf. Icks, "How Armies Are Mechanizing,"* cited, p. 334-335.

34. *Cf. The Times*, July 3, 1934.

35. Great Britain, House of Commons, *Debates*, cited, January 31, 1934.

36. *Cf. New York Times*, July 14, 1934.

37. *Cf. New York Times*, September 19, 1934.

38. *Ibid.*

which is a constant challenge to French supremacy in the Mediterranean.⁴⁷ A further threat to French supremacy was implied in the announcement in 1934 that plans had been drawn for two 35,000 ton capital ships to be built in Italian yards within the next few years.⁴⁸

GERMANY

The marked acceleration of military activity throughout Europe dates from the advent of the Hitler government. Since Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference in October 1933, the Nazi régime has been charged, officially and unofficially, with conducting warlike preparations in violation of the Versailles Treaty. The French government, in a note of April 17, 1934,⁴⁹ categorically declared that "the rearmament effected by Germany in violation of treaties" was an accepted fact. Unofficial reports have spoken in less diplomatic language of industrial and military activities which point to armament preparations on a large scale.⁵⁰ To these charges Chancellor Hitler and the German Foreign Office have issued repeated denials, while continuing to press for recognition of the German claim to equality within a general disarmament convention.⁵¹

Although it is difficult to establish the truth of these charges and denials, the belief that Germany is proceeding rapidly with a program of military and air expansion was strengthened in Europe by the publication of the German budget for 1934-1935. The estimates for the Reichswehr increased from 482 million marks in 1934 to 654 million in 1935, while naval estimates rose from 186 million marks to 236 million. Even greater increase was reflected in aviation estimates, which jumped from 77 million marks to 210 million.⁵² A sharp inquiry from the British government drew from Berlin a denial that these increases represented a violation of the Versailles Treaty. The German government admitted, however, that the increase in army estimates was due to preparations for the reorganization of the Reichswehr on a short-term basis. The expenditure for aviation was said to be for replacement of commercial airplanes and protection against air attack.⁵³

Additional evidence of military activity

47. Cf. Appendix, p. 221, Table II.

48. Cf. *Le Temps*, June 20, 1934.

49. *The Times*, April 19, 1934.

50. Cf. Testimony of Curtiss-Wright and United Aircraft officials. U. S. Senate, *Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1934).

51. Cf. German disarmament memoranda of January 19 and March 13, 1934, printed respectively in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, February 17, 1934, and Great Britain, Foreign Office, Miscellaneous No. 5 (1934), *Further Memoranda on Disarmament, February 14 to April 17, 1934* (London, H. M. Stationery Office) Cmd. 4559.

52. *The Times*, April 17, 1934. Cf. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Teil II, March 26, 1934.

53. *New York Times*, April 17, 1934.

was brought out in the United States by the Senate committee investigating the munitions traffic. American airplane and armament companies testified regarding increased sales to Germany since 1933. A contract between the Pratt and Whitney Company and the Bayerische Motoren Werke of Munich revealed that the American concern had sold its patent rights on airplane engines to the German company in return for a royalty of \$200 on each American-designed engine produced in Germany. When subsequently the German company objected to reporting the number of airplane engines produced on Pratt and Whitney designs, the contract was changed to provide for an annual payment of \$50,000.⁵⁴

Other reports from Germany describe the renewed activity in plants formerly devoted to the manufacture of armaments, motor cars and airplane equipment.⁵⁵ German newspapers openly report the encouragement offered by General Goering, as Reich Air Minister, to the *Luftsportsverband* (Air Sports Union) and the *Luftschutzbund* (Air Protection League).

This outward evidence of military activity has partly obscured the fundamental conflict which has been raging in Germany over the future organization of the armed forces. The Goering faction supported the type of army organization which the Reichswehr had evolved after the Treaty of Versailles fixed its size at 100,000 men, recruited for a twelve-year term. Under the direction of General von Seeckt, this small force was intensively drilled to move at great speed against poorly trained, unwieldy mass armies, and to deliver a quick, crushing blow by efficient use of the most modern war material. It was expected that, once the initial advantage had been secured, this force could then train and lead a citizen militia to bring war to a conclusion.⁵⁶

The more radical Storm Troop leaders, headed by Ernst Roehm, desired the elimination of the Reichswehr as a distinct and predominant power which might successfully oppose the actions of the new régime. The Roehm group envisaged a mass army of conscripts and looked forward to the ultimate consolidation of the Reichswehr and the Storm Troop units as a step in this direction.⁵⁷ Roehm had in fact incorporated 2,500,000 men in the Storm Troop and Special Guard sections of the party by the spring of 1934, and many observers assert that they received military

54. Cf. *New York Times*, September 18, 1934. Senator Vandenberg, a member of the committee, asked whether this contract would not indicate that the German concern expected to produce at least 250 engines a year.

55. Cf. *New York Times*, May 11, 1934.

56. Hans von Seeckt, *Die Reichswehr* (Leipzig, Kittler Verlag, 1933), p. 35f., 43, 99, 101.

57. Cf. Ernst Roehm, *Die Geschichte eines Hochverrätters* (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1933) 4th ed., p. 178, 213, 283, 296-297.

training.⁵⁸ It is significant that these units were organized on a regular military basis, from squads through brigades. Four brigades were included in a so-called *Gruppe* (region), and the *Gruppen* were in turn united in seven *Obergruppen* (superior regions) which corresponded exactly with the seven regional divisions of the Reichswehr.⁵⁹ The charge has also been made that military training is given to the various Nazi youth organizations and the Voluntary Labor Corps, service in which is now virtually compulsory for young men.

After some hesitation, Germany accepted in principle a French proposal at the Disarmament Conference in 1933, calling for the transformation of all European armies to a uniform short-term militia basis. On December 18, 1933 the German government formally proposed the conversion of the Reichswehr into a short-term service army of 300,000 men.⁶⁰ This proposal apparently still stands, and preparations are being made for its execution.⁶¹ Had Roehm's views prevailed, the Storm Troops would have become a reserve for the Reichswehr. The issue came to a head in the "purge" of June 30, 1934, when Roehm and other Nazi leaders were ruthlessly eliminated. Since June 30 it has become apparent that Hitler is supporting the aristocratic military group who are building an army along the lines laid down by von Seeckt.⁶² The Storm Troop organization has been reduced in size and restricted to purely political activities. The evidence suggests that the Reich is concentrating on the task of acquiring material and developing war industries to a point at which they can furnish sufficient arms and munitions for modern warfare. Special attention has been given to preparedness in the air under the direction of General Goering. It is these developments, which presage a sudden surprise attack, that have aroused the most widespread apprehension in nearby European countries.

THE SOVIET UNION

Although reliable information with respect to the Red Army is difficult to obtain, it is clear that the military forces have been strengthened since the army reorganization of 1925. The Soviet war budget has risen from 831,200,000 rubles in 1927-1928 to 1,573,000,000 in 1933.⁶³ The enormous man-

power of the Soviet Union—the annual contingent of recruits is 1,200,000 men, of whom 800,000 are passed for military service after rigid inspection—forms the basis of an army which combines the advantages of a long-term, highly-trained cadre army with a territorial militia. The regular or "permanent" army of 562,000 men absorbs 260,000 recruits each year; after two years of uninterrupted training, they are recalled for two-month terms of service during the three subsequent years, and then passed into reserve for fifteen years, with three one-month service periods. Two hundred thousand men are incorporated into the territorial militia each year; they serve eight months during their five years of active service and then pass into reserve with the members of the permanent army. The remainder of the contingent, about 340,000 men, receives six months of rudimentary military training and acts as reinforcement for the more highly trained troops in time of war. Only peasants and workers are accepted in the army; men with bourgeois antecedents pay a special military tax and are placed, without previous organization, in a special military reserve which in time of war forms auxiliary units for service in the rear.⁶⁴

The Soviet Union is divided into eleven territorial military areas. According to unofficial sources, the Red Army is organized in twenty-one light infantry corps, composed in turn of twenty-six regular light infantry divisions and forty-five territorial divisions, and four cavalry corps made up of nine regular divisions and five territorial divisions.⁶⁵ Although no official figures have been issued, it is apparent from observers' notes and army demonstrations that the trend is toward complete motorization and coordination of all arms of service, including air forces. Each active infantry battalion has a section of trench mortars and anti-tank guns, a machine-gun company and various machine-gun groups. Every cavalry regiment has a squadron of sixteen machine-guns.⁶⁶ About one-third of the entire artillery is motorized, including all twenty-five heavy artillery regiments and all anti-aircraft artillery. In February 1934 K. E. Voroshilov, Soviet Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, assured the All-Union Communist Party Congress that the Red Army had successfully solved the problem of reconstructing its forces on the basis of new technique.⁶⁷ On

58. League of Nations, *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Conf. D. 166, February 27, 1934. For details on illegal military training in Germany, cf. M. S. Wertheimer, "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 28, 1934.

59. Cf. Leland Stowe, *Nazi Germany Means War* (London, Faber, 1933), p. 20f.

60. League of Nations, *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Conf. D. 166, cited.

61. Cf. German note to British Foreign Office, April 11, 1934. Text in *New York Times*, April 17, 1934.

62. Cf. Hitler's Reichstag address, *The Times*, July 14, 1934.

63. *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 725.

64. Political training and indoctrination are continued in the army, especially among officers.

65. There are also seven independent cavalry brigades and one independent light infantry brigade. *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 705, footnote.

66. *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934, cited, p. 706-707.

67. *Izvestia*, February 4, 1934. The Soviet Commissar gave figures indicating the increase in Russian war material, but the news report states that these were concealed by "loud applause."

the same occasion more than five hundred tanks of all sorts paraded in Moscow;⁶⁸ these, as well as armored cars and trains, are manufactured by Soviet heavy industry. Airplanes and chemicals are also manufactured within the Soviet Union, although production of airplane motors is not yet regarded as satisfactory.⁶⁹ Foreign observers have estimated the number of military airplanes to be as high as 2,800 to 3,000.⁷⁰

Recent events in the Far East have created a potential theater of war along the eastern border of Siberia. The double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway is now virtually complete, and that of the Amur River road to Vladivostok is well under way. Some authorities place the size of the Far Eastern army at 150,000 men, and Commissar Voroshilov has stated that there are more than five hundred Soviet airplanes in the territory.⁷¹

JAPAN

Since the beginning of the Manchurian conflict in 1931 Japanese military and naval expenditures have more than doubled, and the proportion of the total budget devoted to national defense has increased from approximately 25 to 43 per cent. During the period of the Liberal Shidehara régime, national defense outlays declined from 517 million yen in 1928 to 443 million yen in 1930.⁷² By 1932, when the Manchurian campaign was in full swing, the army and navy received 697 million yen; in 1933 military and naval appropriations reached 851 million yen; and in 1934 they exceeded the previous peace-time peak with a total of 937 million yen.⁷³ There is no expectation that these huge outlays will be reduced in the near future; on the contrary, Japanese military authorities anticipate additional increases for several years to come,⁷⁴ as the army has not yet completed its reorganization program and the navy is faced with a heavy construction schedule until the completion of its building program in 1939.

The army reorganization plan, originally approved in 1930, was extended and accelerated as a result of the Manchurian campaign. Under the revised plan the army in

Manchuria was placed on a war footing and the fighting units increased to full war strength, the military training system for cadets was overhauled, and an extensive program for augmenting stocks of arms and ammunition was initiated.⁷⁵ The reorganization plan, however, does not contemplate a fundamental change in the tactical organization of the army, which is patterned on the 1918 European model. The peace-time forces consist of seventeen divisions, with seventy infantry regiments, twenty-five cavalry, thirty-one artillery, and four engineer regiments.⁷⁶ The total peace-time strength is approximately 259,000 officers and men. War-time mobilization of reserve units would probably enable Japan to place more than 1,000,000 men in the field.⁷⁷

In anticipation of the 1935 naval conference, the Japanese Diet has adopted two large "replenishment" programs which will bring the fleet up to the maximum levels of the Washington and London treaties by December 31, 1936. The first program, enacted in 1931, will carry through 1938.⁷⁸ Interpellations in the Diet during January 1934 drew from Admiral Osumi, the Navy Minister, the information that naval expenditures during the coming years would exceed the record appropriations voted in 1934.⁷⁹ These heavy outlays were justified on the ground that the nation would face a "supreme national crisis" in 1935-1936, when the naval limitation treaties come up for review and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations becomes effective.⁸⁰

In common with other powers, Japan has devoted particular attention to the development of air strength. The air forces are divided into units which are attached to the army and navy, as in the United States, and their strength has been substantially increased since the World War. Their precise numerical strength in 1934 has not been revealed, but according to the official figures submitted to the League of Nations in 1931, Japan possessed at that time 838 airplanes in the army air force and 801 in that of the navy—a total of 1,639.⁸¹ The actual strength in 1931 was probably somewhat below this level, as the official figures included airplanes under construction as well as those projected in

68. Cf. *New York Times*, February 10, 1934.

69. *Izvestia*, February 4, 1934.

70. "Die Sowjetunion als Militärstaat," *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 25, 1934. According to the *Armaments Year-Book, 1934*, the U.S.S.R. had 750 military planes in service on January 1, 1931.

71. *Militär-Wochenblatt*, June 18, 1934, p. 1643; "Militärische Siedlung und Industrialisierung in Sibirien," *ibid.*, July 18, 1934, p. 96, July 25, 1934, p. 149.

72. Japan, Department of Finance, *Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, 1933* (Tokyo, Government Printing Office), p. 54-55.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 55. Cf. Appendix, Table III, p. 222 for detailed expenditures.

74. *Trans-Pacific* (Tokyo), July 19, 1934.

75. *Japan Year Book, 1933*, p. 242.

76. *Armaments Year-Book, 1933*, cited, p. 429-430.

77. With a peace-time strength of 220,000 in 1904, Japan raised a field army of nearly a million men in the Russo-Japanese War. Cf. *Japan Year Book, 1933*, p. 230.

78. Stone, "Impending Naval Rivalry," cited.

79. *Trans-Pacific*, February 1, 1934.

80. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1933.

81. Cf. League of Nations, Documents of the Disarmament Conference, *Particulars Concerning the Armaments of the Different Countries*, No. 11, Communication from the Japanese Government C.558, M.228, 1931 IX.

army and navy programs.⁸² Since 1931, however, twenty-two new flying corps have been authorized for the navy, fourteen under the first naval replenishment program and eight under the second replenishment program. Of these only four have been established; the remainder are to be completed by 1937. The army air force, according to reports in the Japanese press, will be materially increased under a new expansion program to be begun in the fiscal year 1935-1936.⁸³ The War Office has issued statistics, widely published in the Japanese press, seeking to demonstrate the superiority of foreign air forces and pointing especially to the reported expansion of military aviation in the Soviet Union. Japanese military authorities state that the U.S.S.R. has increased its air force from 1,500 planes to 3,000 and has concentrated 500 military planes in the Far East. Vladivostok is within 850 miles of Tokyo and Osaka, easily within striking distance of Soviet bombing airplanes. These considerations, according to a War Office spokesman, lead to the conclusion that: "... the only effective air defense is to attack the attacking forces by placing numerous airplanes into action For this purpose Japan must have an efficient air corps equipped with excellent planes."⁸⁴ The army's views on national defense were set forth more fully in a pamphlet issued by the War Office on October 2, at a time when the 1935-1936 budget was in preparation. This publication, which apparently was issued without the knowledge of Cabinet officials, pointed to the necessity for domestic economic reforms and emphasized the need for strengthening the air defenses of the nation. It declared that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed a combined total of 6,000 airplanes, against which Japan's total strength of 1,000 planes was inadequate.⁸⁵

UNITED STATES

Unlike most European countries, the United States had not embraced the doctrine of the "nation in arms" before the World War. In 1914 the Regular Army of 87,000 men was not organized for large-scale operations outside the territorial United States or prepared for immediate expansion into a citizens' army, while the navy ranked third among the naval powers. In 1920, however, as a result of wartime experience in raising an army of 4,000,000 men, Congress amended the National Defense Act to provide for "the immediate mobilization" of the man-power

and industrial resources of the nation in time of war.⁸⁶ In 1922, following the Washington conference which limited the capital ship strength of the United States, Great Britain and Japan in the ratio of 5-5-3, the United States proclaimed its new policy of a navy "second to none" to "support the national policies and commerce" of the nation.⁸⁷

Under the National Defense Act of 1920 the peace-time forces of the United States consist of three components: the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves, forming a skeleton organization capable of rapid expansion in time of war. The War Department, charged with carrying out the terms of the Act, assumes the immediate adoption of a draft law by Congress in the event of a major crisis and contemplates the mobilization of an army of 4,000,000 men, with combat troops organized in four field armies.⁸⁸ In 1933 the strength of the Regular Army provided by appropriations was 118,750 men, 12,000 officers and 6,500 Philippine Scouts. The strength of the National Guard, which is supported in part by federal funds, was 190,000 officers and men.⁸⁹ By placing its chief emphasis on training civilian components, as required by the mobilization plan, the General Staff has encountered difficulty in maintaining more than 50,000 men in active combat units. The mechanization and motorization program has been retarded by lack of funds, due to the cost of personnel. Motorization, however, has been accelerated with emergency public works funds allocated to the army under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.⁹⁰

Under the Washington and London naval treaties "parity" has been the major objective of American naval policy. While Congress was at first reluctant to vote the necessary funds for new construction, it finally accepted the 5-5-3 ratio as essential to the defense of the United States. In 1933 the first installment of a program designed to achieve the maximum treaty levels was sanctioned by President Roosevelt and financed by an allotment of \$238,000,000 from emergency public works funds.⁹¹ In March 1934 Congress adopted the Vinson Act, authorizing construction of a full treaty navy as rapidly as possible. In August the Navy Department awarded contracts for twenty-four

86. Cf. W. T. Stone, "The National Defense Policy of the United States," *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 31, 1932 for detailed description.

87. Cf. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1922* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 2.

88. Cf. *Report of the Chief of Staff U. S. Army, 1933* (Washington, Government Printing Office).

89. United States, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, War Department Appropriation Bill for 1935, *Hearings before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations* (Washington, Government Printing Office), p. 4.

90. Cf. p. 219.

91. Cf. Stone, "Impending Naval Rivalry," cited.

82. The number of airplanes in service with tactical units was not given in the figures submitted to the League.

83. Cf. *Trans-Pacific*, July 5, 1934.

84. *Trans-Pacific*, July 5, 1934.

85. *Washington Post*, October 2, 1934.

cruisers, destroyers and submarines and proceeded with plans to complete the entire program of one hundred and two ships by 1939.⁹²

The air forces of the United States have been developed under the separate jurisdiction of the army and navy. Proposals for an independent air department, on an equal footing with the War and Navy Departments, have been rejected by various boards and commissions over a period of years. In 1925 the Morrow Board, after a careful study of aviation policy, recommended that the separate services be continued and that the strength of the air forces be based on the defensive requirements of the United States.⁹³ This board concluded that "there is no present reason for any apprehension of any invasion from overseas directly by way of the air; nor indeed is there any apparent probability of such invasion in any future which can be foreseen."⁹⁴ In 1926, however, Congress enacted a five-year program of air expansion, increasing the authorized strength of the Army Air Corps to 1,800 planes and that of the Naval Air Service to 1,000 planes.⁹⁵ The program was not carried out as rapidly as contemplated, but on June 30, 1933 the strength of the Army Air Corps was 1,497 serviceable planes, while the Naval Air Service totaled 971 planes.⁹⁶ Further expansion of the army air forces was recommended by the General Staff in 1933 and by the Special Committee on Army Air Corps, headed by former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, in July 1934. The Baker committee cited the "impracticability of hostile air invasion" except in conjunction with land or naval forces,⁹⁷ but approved the War Department plan for a general headquarters force of 1,000 bombing, pursuit and attack planes under the direct control of the Chief of Staff. This great striking force is to be organized in five "wings," based on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Middle West, and could be used, according to a statement by General MacArthur, Chief of Staff, on "independent missions of destruction aimed at the vital

arteries of a nation, or divided up and used as necessity demanded."⁹⁸ The total strength recommended by the Baker committee for the Army Air Corps was 2,300 planes. The authorized strength of the naval air forces was increased to 2,100 planes in the Vinson Act. The combined strength under these programs exceeds that of any other power.

The increasing cost of maintaining the post-war standards of national defense is revealed in the annual army and navy budgets. In 1913 total army and navy appropriations amounted to \$244,000,000; in 1926 military and naval expenditures aggregated \$591,000,000; and in 1930 they exceeded \$700,000,000—an increase of roughly 190 per cent since 1913. Although military and naval expenditures were reduced from 1931 to 1933 under the Hoover economy régime, estimates for the fiscal year 1935 foreshadow the largest national defense expenditure in the peacetime history of the nation. In addition to the regular appropriations for 1934 and 1935, the army and navy have received more than \$373,000,000 from the Public Works Administration under the authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act.⁹⁹ An additional \$41,000,000 was allotted the Navy Department for the first year's program under the Vinson Bill from the public works appropriation granted in the Emergency Appropriation Act of 1934.¹⁰⁰ It is estimated that the expenditure of these large sums for new capital equipment will raise the Navy Department budget to over \$500,000,000 beginning in 1936, and the War Department budget to over \$300,000,000.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey indicates a marked acceleration in the military preparations of all the great powers, beginning in the Far East with the outbreak of the Manchurian controversy in the fall of 1931 and extending to Europe following the advent of the Nazi régime in Germany in the spring of 1933. During the past twelve months the military budgets of Japan, Germany, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States have shown substantial increases, while the apparent budgetary reductions in France and Italy have been more than offset by large extraordinary credits for new national de-

92. Cf. below.

93. Cf. United States, President's Aircraft Board, *Report of President's Aircraft Board*, November 30, 1925 (Washington, Government Printing Office), p. 10.

94. *Ibid.*

95. United States, *The Statutes at Large of the U. S. A.*, December 1925-March 1927, Vol. XLIV, part 3, *An Act to provide more effectively for the national defense by increasing the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Army of the United States*.

96. The Army Air Corps on June 30, 1933 was composed of 367 pursuit planes, 159 bombing planes, 88 attack planes, 370 observation planes and 513 training and auxiliary types. The naval air force on the same date possessed 221 fighting planes, 148 scouting planes, 88 bombing planes, 249 observation planes and 265 training, transport and utility types. Cf. War Department Appropriation Bill for 1935, *Hearings before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations*, cited, p. 476; United States, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1934, *Hearing before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 432.

97. United States, *Final Report of War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 17.

98. *Washington Post*, October 4, 1934.

99. The major projects to be carried out with these grants include the following: *Navy Department*—construction of 32 naval vessels, \$238,000,000; procurement of 130 new aircraft and aircraft equipment, \$7,500,000; construction work at shore stations, \$27,500,000 (including \$9,000,000 for Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Hawaii). *War Department* (military activities)—army housing, \$71,009,000; procurement of army aircraft, \$7,500,000; motorization equipment, \$10,000,000; seacoast defenses, \$7,000,000; ordnance and munitions, \$8,309,000; National Guard Bureau, \$2,238,000. Cf. United States, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, *Series R.D.*, No. 900, August 12, 1934.

100. United States, 73rd Congress, H.R.9830, approved June 19 1934.

fense projects. With the exception of Germany, which is still legally bound by the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, all of these countries are expending larger sums on their armed forces than they did in 1914.

The most striking feature of the current period of military activity is the concentration on air power and war material. In 1914 European powers were chiefly concerned with increasing their man-power; during the five years preceding the World War Germany, France and Russia perfected the system of mobilizing the largest number of trained men in the shortest possible time. In 1934, while most of the great powers continue to rely on mass armies, their military

effort is directed toward restoring the mobility of land forces and developing the offensive possibilities of aerial warfare. The mounting military budgets are due in large part to expenditures for the rapidly growing air forces and procurement of new war material. Although mechanization has not transformed the organization of modern armies, increasing amounts are being devoted to the building of tank units and the motorization of cavalry and artillery.

With the great powers unable to reach any agreement on the political issues which have blocked the Disarmament Conference, the prospect for controlling the impending armament race is far from bright.

Table I

PEACE-TIME EFFECTIVES OF THE PRINCIPAL LAND ARMED FORCES, 1913-1934

The following figures are based on peace-time effectives serving in the land armed forces in 1913 and 1934. Differences in systems of army organization make impossible any attempt at accurate comparison on the basis of numbers alone. Of the three general types of organization, only the professional army, which is recruited by voluntary enlistment for a relatively long period, is adequately represented by the figures giving total effectives. The figures for conscript armies represent the number of professional soldiers and conscripts provided for by law or in the budget, except where otherwise designated. In the case of militia forces who serve a certain number of days each year, the figures show only the permanent effectives who train the forces. Pre-war figures are taken from the *Statesman's Year-Book* and denote effectives provided for by law but not always recruited. Post-war figures are based on data from the *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934.

Country	Type of Army	Year	Effectives	Year	Effectives
Argentina	Conscript	1913	24,000	1932	33,425
Austria-Hungary	Conscript	1913	450,000
Austria	Professional	1934	21,050 ^a
Belgium	Conscript	1913	53,600	1934	67,846 ^b
Bolivia	Conscript	1913	3,000	1928	8,000 ^d
Brazil	Conscript	1913	23,500	1932	63,524
British Empire					
Great Britain and					
Northern Ireland	Professional	1913	174,000	1933-4	140,241
Australia	Vol. Militia	1913	2,662	1933-4	1,612
Canada	Vol. Militia	1913	3,520	1933	3,570
India					
British Troops	Professional	1913	75,857	1933-4	58,576
Indian Troops	Professional	1913	150,000	1933-4	158,998
Irish Free State	Professional	1933-4	5,854
New Zealand	Militia	1933-4	564
Union of South Africa					
British Troops	Militia	1913	6,800	1933	1,555
Bulgaria	Professional	1913	59,900	1933-4	19,956
Chile	Conscript	1913	20,000	1932	12,053
China	Vol. & Conscript	1931	1,260,000
Colombia	Conscript	1913	7,000	1930	8,499
Cuba	Professional	1913	11,105	1931	14,022
Czechoslovakia	Conscript	1934	113,494
Denmark	Conscript	1913	10,600	1930-1	8,093 [*]
Estonia	Conscript	1933	10,849
Finland	Conscript	1933	27,529
France	Conscript	1913	790,000	1933	479,044
Germany	Professional	1913	791,000	1933	102,218
Greece	Conscript	1913	29,000	1932-3	53,043
Hungary	Professional	1932-3	35,036
Italy	Conscript	1913	304,672	1933-4	250,950
Japan	Conscript	1913	250,000	1933	299,824 [*]
Jugoslavia (Serbia)	Conscript	1913	51,000	1933-4	107,651
Latvia	Conscript	23,000
Lithuania	Conscript	1933	19,466
Mexico	Professional	1913	29,533	1931	60,425
Netherlands	Conscript	1913	22,955	1932	19,794 ^c
Norway	Comp. Militia	1913	10,564	1933-4	2,633

Table I (continued)

Country	Type of Army	Year	Effectives	Year	Effectives
Paraguay	Conscript	1913	2,600	1927-8	2,915 ^a
Peru	Conscript	1913	6,500	1930	9,045
Poland	Conscript	1934	266,015
Portugal	Conscript	1913	32,800	1933-4	31,054 ^e
Rumania	Conscript	1912	104,460	1933-4	141,385
Russia	Conscript	1913	1,200,000	1934	562,000
Spain	Conscript	1913	122,000	1933	158,856 ^f
Sweden	Conscript	1913	25,475	1933	20,593
Switzerland	Militia	1913	4,000	1934	302
Turkey	Conscript	1913	230,000	1931	194,000*
United States	Professional	1913	92,035	1933	136,850 ^g

*Indicates average daily effectives, obtained by dividing by 365 the sum of the number of days served by each member of the armed forces during the year.

a. There are also 8,000 rank and file on temporary short-term service.

b. The colonial army, not included above, has a strength of 13,506.

c. There are also 33,559 effectives in the Netherlands Indies.

d. Forces have been greatly increased since the Chaco war.

e. There are also 10,668 effectives in the colonies.

f. 37,325 of these effectives are in Morocco (1933).

g. Includes Army Air Corps.

Table II

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD*

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD*							Additional per- mitted by treaty to be laid down before Dec. 31, 1936	
Total Built			Total built under-age on Dec. 31, 1933		Building and appropriated for**			
UNITED STATES:	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Capital Ships	15	455,400	14	429,300	0	000	0	000
Aircraft Carriers..	4	92,000	3	80,500	2	40,000	1	14,500
Cruisers (a)	16	149,775	15	142,425	3	30,000	0	000
Cruisers (b)	10	70,500	10	70,500	7	70,000	2	17,100
Destroyers	228	250,715	4	4,935	45	71,000	51	77,635
Submarines	84	70,040	47	48,780	10	13,000	24	22,740
TOTAL	357	1,088,430	93	776,440	67	224,000	78	136,975***

BRITISH EMPIRE:

Capital Ships	15	474,750	15	474,750	0	000	0	000
Aircraft Carriers..	6	115,350	6	115,350	1	15,000	1	19,100†
Cruisers (a)	19	183,686	19	183,686	0	000	0	000
Cruisers (b)	32	159,170	22	116,880	13	93,800	8	55,030
Destroyers	152	174,444	44	58,374	36	49,750	30	51,221
Submarines	52	51,259	33	40,849	12	12,910	5	7,562
TOTAL	276	1,158,659	139	989,889	62	171,460	44	132,913

JAPAN:

Capital Ships	9	272,070	8	242,740	0	000	0	000
Aircraft Carriers ..	4	68,370	4	68,370	2	20,100	0	000
Cruisers (a)	14	123,520	12	107,800	0	000	0	000
Cruisers (b)	20	93,375	17	81,455	6	51,000	0	000
Destroyers	103	122,101	61	82,281	24	34,396	1(est.)	1,500†
Submarines	70	77,125	63	71,779	13	19,200	0	000
TOTAL	220	756,561	165	654,425	45	124,696	1(est.)	1,500

FRANCE:

TOTAL	196	555,266	135	372,609	37	141,103‡‡‡‡
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ITALY:

TOTAL	171	370,589	109	290,780	34	129,125‡‡‡‡
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*Source: U. S. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, September 15, 1934.

**All tonnages in this column are estimated.

***This tonnage is authorized by the Vinson Act of 1934.

†May also replace *Furious*, *Eagle* and *Hermes* (experimental ships).

‡Available to replace *Miyuki* sunk about July 1, 1934.

‡‡France and Italy not subject to limitation under London Naval Treaty.

Table III
NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1913 AND 1930-1934
(In millions of national currency)

	<i>1913-14</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1931</i>	<i>1932</i>	<i>1933</i>	<i>1934</i>
<i>Great Britain^a</i>	<i>National Defense</i>				<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>
Army		32.5	31.1	28.8	30.6	32.3
Navy		44.3	42.9	41.8	45.0	47.7
Air		17.3	17.6	17.1	16.8	17.0
Middle Eastern Services		1.0	.8	.5	.2
Non-effective Services		17.5	17.5	17.3	17.7	17.9
Total (Pounds Sterling) ..	77.2	112.6	109.9	105.5	110.3	114.9
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	114	104	100	102

	<i>1913-14</i>	<i>1930-31</i>	<i>1931-32</i>	<i>1932</i>	<i>1933</i>	<i>1934</i>
<i>France^b</i>	<i>National Defense</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>		<i>(Nine Months)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>
Ministry of War		6,278.5	6,401.0	5,218.7	6,080.9	5,946.0
Ministry of Marine		2,722.7	2,799.8	2,411.3	2,712.3	2,943.3
Air Ministry		2,018.9	2,199.4	1,826.5	1,996.2	1,654.0
Ministry of Colonies		465.1	621.6	508.5	657.9	643.6
Army of Occupation		114.5
Total (Francs)	1,807.0	11,599.7	12,021.8	9,965.0	11,447.3	11,186.9
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	554	502	427	398	397

	<i>1913-14</i>	<i>1930-31</i>	<i>1931-32</i>	<i>1932-33</i>	<i>1933-34</i>	<i>1934-35</i>
<i>Italy^c</i>	<i>National Defense</i>			<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>
Ministry of War		2,987.2	2,828.0	2,741.1	2,397.1	2,285.2
Ministry of Marine		1,447.2	1,489.7	1,439.8	1,261.1	1,088.7
Ministry of Aviation		732.5	695.1	678.1	619.8	632.9
Civil Mobilization		0.9	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6
Barrack Construction		8.0	10.0
Ministry of Colonies		468.0	416.0	334.0	305.5	292.4
Total (Lire)	927.9	5,643.8	5,439.6	5,193.6	4,584.1	4,299.8
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	351	316	290	276

	<i>1913-14</i>	<i>1930-31</i>	<i>1931-32</i>	<i>1932-33</i>	<i>1933-34</i>	<i>1934-35</i>
<i>Japan^d</i>	<i>National Defense</i>			<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>	<i>(Estimates)</i>
Army						
Ordinary		174.5	163.7	166.3	172.1	168.6
Extraordinary		26.3	63.8	224.1	276.0	280.9
Total Army		200.8	227.5	390.4	448.1	449.5
Navy						
Ordinary		146.9	138.9	140.8	178.8	199.3
Extraordinary		95.1	88.2	166.0	224.9	288.5
Total Navy		242.0	227.1	306.8	403.7	487.8
Grand Total (Yen)	191.8	442.8	454.6	697.2	851.8	937.3
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	129	116	126	135

	1913-14	1929-30	1931	1932	1933	1934
<i>Russia^a</i>	<i>National Defense</i>			(Estimates)	(Estimates)	(Estimates)
Military and Naval Affairs ..		1,046.0	1,288.4	1,278.5	1,450.0	1,665.0
Special Forces		67.1	100.5	118.0	123.7	130.0
Escort Troops		12.3	15.1
Special Account		24.8
Total (Rubles)	869.5	1,150.2	1,404.0	1,396.5	1,573.7	1,795.0
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	185
<hr/>						
	1913-14	1930-31	1931-32	1932-33	1933-34	1934-35
<i>Germany^f</i>	<i>National Defense</i>				(Estimates)	(Estimates)
Defense Department		676.0	613.9	629.7	671.1	894.3
War Charges		5.1	3.1	4.0	0.6
Total (Reichsmarks)	1,947.7	681.1	617.0	633.7	671.7	894.3
Index of Wholesale Prices	100	121	107	94	94
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	1913-14	1930-31	1931-32	1932-33	1933-34	1934-35
<i>United States^g</i>	<i>National Defense</i>				(Estimates)	
War Department (excluding non-military activities)		345.3	344.6	298.4	290.9	256.5
Navy Department		358.2	354.3	343.1	337.4	455.0
Total	244.6	703.5	698.9	641.5	628.3	711.5
Index of Wholesale Prices (1926=100)	67	79	68	63	70

NOTES: a. For pre-war expenditure, cf. Great Britain, Parliamentary White Paper, Cmd. 1665 (London, May 15, 1922). Post-war expenditure compiled from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. Pre-war and post-war figures show net expenditures, including ordinary pensions and certain war charges shown in the budgets of the fighting services, but excluding World War pensions.

b. Pre-war figures from League of Nations, *Budget Expenditure on National Defense 1913 and 1920-22*, A.31. (a) (Geneva, 1922). Post-war figures compiled from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. The latter do not include pensions or expenditure for fortification systems.

c. Pre-war figures from League of Nations, *Budget Expenditure on National Defense, 1913 and 1920-22*, cited. Post-war figures compiled from League of Nations *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. No pensions included.

d. Pre-war figures from League of Nations, *Budget Expenditure on National Defense, 1913 and 1920-22*, cited. Post-war figures through 1933-34 compiled from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. 1934-35 figures from *Trans-Pacific*, December 7, 1933. Pensions not included.

e. Pre-war figures from Jacobsson, "Armaments Expenditure of the World," cited. Post-war figures compiled from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. Pre-war figures include pensions. Post-war figures include pensions and expenditure on social insurance for the civilian personnel.

f. Pre-war figures from Jacobsson, "Armaments Expenditure of the World," cited. Post-war figures compiled from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. Pensions not included in pre-war and post-war figures. For the budget of the Air Ministry, see text, p. 215.

g. Pre-war figures from United States, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1914* (Washington, Government Printing Office). Post-war figures from League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1934. The figures include air force expenditures but not pensions. Emergency expenditures for military purposes are included as follows: Army, 1933-34, \$61.9 million; 1934-35, \$26 million; Navy, 1933-34, \$56.1 million; 1934-35, \$144.7 million.

Table IV
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NATIONAL BUDGETS REPRESENTED BY
NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURE
(In millions of national currency)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total National Budget 1934</i>	<i>National Defense Expenditure</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Budget Devoted to National Defense</i>
France	Franks 50,162.0	Franks 11,186.9	22.3
Germany	Marks 6,458.3	Marks 1,104.5*	17.1
Great Britain	£ 698.1	£ 114.9	16.4
Italy	Lire 20,636.0	Lire 4,299.8	20.8
Japan	Yen 2,142.5	Yen 937.3	43.7
United States	Dollars 3,960.8	Dollars 711.5	17.9

*Includes 210.2 million Reichsmarks for the Air Ministry.

Statement of the Ownership, Management, Circulation, Etc., Required by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1933 of

Foreign Policy Reports

Published biweekly at New York, N. Y., for October 1, 1934.
 State of New York, County of New York, ss.:

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Vera Micheles Dean, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the Editor of the FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse side of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher—Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y.

Editor—Vera Micheles Dean, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y.

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2. That the owner is:

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3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of the total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are:

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By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 24th day of September, 1934.

[Seal]

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public.

New York County, New York County Clerk's No. 95. Reg. No. 5M516. (My commission expires March 30, 1935.)